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Executive Summary
This report has the objective to describe the demonstrator developed in the context of
the project Goods Digital Identification against Fraud and Counterfeiting, which supports
the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO). One of the goals of this project is
to investigate and develop techniques to detect counterfeit products and electronic devices
in particular. Because counterfeit electronic devices are usually built with different (e.g.,
cheaper) materials or different manufacturing processes than proper electronic devices, one
of the main techniques is based on the capability to identify electronic devices on the basis
of their physical properties. These physical properties can appear in the digital information
generated by the mobile phone in its operation. For example, the Radio Frequency (RF)
emissions from the communication systems of a mobile phone can be used to identify the
phone and its model. In this report, we describe a demonstrator to identify mobile phones
on the basis of the radio frequency emissions generated by the transmission components
implemented for the GSM wireless standard. We demonstrate that we can distinguish mo-
bile phones not only for different brands and models but also for phones of the same brand
and model and different serial numbers. The demonstrator is designed and implemented
using low cost systems and machine learning algorithms. In addition to the fight against
counterfeitng, the identification of electronic devices and mobile phones in particular can
be used to support forensics and criminal investigation. In this context, this work can also
be used to support EUROPOL.
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1. Introduction
As described in (1) and (2), the authentication of an electronic device, component or sys-
tem is an important function in the fight against counterfeiting and Intellectual Property
Rights (IPR) infringement in the electronics market. The authors in (1) have defined a tax-
onomy of the counterfeit Integrated Circuits (IC)s in different categories where the device
identification methods described in this report can be applied. These categories include
recycled, remarked, out-of-spec/defective or overproduced components. Recycled compo-
nents are used in IC components, which are repackaged and remarked, and then sold in
the market as new. Because they are old and used, recycled components could have a
different fingerprints than brand new components due to time wear or degradation. The
remarking process includes the removal of markings on the package (or even on the die)
and remarking with forged information. The reason for remarking is to obtain an higher
specification (e.g., from commercial grade part to industrial or defense grade) and resell a
cheaper component for an higher price. In this case, the difference in quality between high
specification and low specification components could be identified through the techniques
described in this article. For examples, the authors in (3) shows that clock stability in
oscillators is directly related to the quality of hardware components. In another example,
the authors of (4) have shown that a low grade RF amplifier has a distinct RF signature
in comparison to an high grade amplifier and this can be detected by the analysis of the
spectral response. Still further research work and studies are needed to evaluate how
recycled and remarked electronic components produce different fingerprints from newly
produced components. Out-of-spec or defective products can be subject to a similar anal-
ysis of remarked products because they are built with components out of specifications or
even defective. A key element for the identification of counterfeit electronic components
in this category is the knowledge on how a defect can modify the fingerprint of the com-
ponent. Finally, the overproduced components could be the more difficult to identify as
overproducing often means that components are produced in the same foundry and similar
materials of proper components outside the contract. In this case, the counterfeiters gain is
due to the infringement of the Intellectual Property Rights rather than use cheaper compo-
nents and materials. As a consequence, the fingerprints due to material or features of the
manufacturing line would not be usable to detect counterfeit products. To summarize, the
fight against the distribution of counterfeit products can exploit the techniques described
in this report for identification purposes. The challenging goal is to find features and algo-
rithms which can distinguish mobile phones on the basis of the physical properties of their
RF components. Both supervised and unsupervised machine learning algorithms could be
used for this purpose. The first set of algorithms could be used to identify if a mobile phone
is a non-counterfeit item on the basis of a previously created reference library of proper
phones, while the second set of algorithms could be used to generate clusters of proper
and counterfeit phones to support the identification (e.g., on the basis of the similarity to
one of the clusters) of new mobile phones to be identified.
In this report, we focus on the application of supervised algorithms, where a reference
library based on the RF emissions of known phones is used to identify phones. Coun-
terfeit phones are not available because of strong restrictions by the customs officers in
the various European countries. Customs officers are bound to sequester and lock away
counterfeit products including mobile phones. Then, in this report a counterfeit phone is
simulated by claiming that a phone is of a different model than what it is and by check-
ing if the algorithm is able to verify the claim. This is a common approach used in re-
search literature as demonstrated in (5) and (6). The work presented in this report is
part of a wider project for the identification of electronic devices and mobile phones in
support of EUIPO and its Observatory. The Observatory is a platform-based body that
brings public and private sector experts together in a dynamic exchange network. The Ob-
servatory works as a think-tank that gathers, monitors and reports crucial information to
assist policy makers and authorities engaged in protecting and enforcing IP rights (see
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/european-observatory). In addition to the fight
against counterfeitng, the identification of electronic devices and mobile phones in par-
ticular can be used to support forensics and criminal investigation. In this context, this
work can also be used to support EUROPOL.
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The structure of the report is following: section 2 describes the main concepts of RF fin-
gerprinting. Because GSM is the standard of choice for fingerprinting used in this report,
a description of the GSM standard is provided in section 3. Then, section 4 describes the
methodology and the application of statistical features and the machine learning algorithms
used to classify and verify the mobile phones. The results of the application of the algo-
rithms are described in section 5. Finally, section 6 provides the conclusion of the report.
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2. The concept of radio frequency fingerprinting
In this context, we use the term fingerprinting to refer to the process by which observable
characteristics are extracted from a mobile phone in order to make it identifiable and distin-
guishable from another one of the same brand or even of the same model. The observation
of these characteristics can be performed in different ways, which will be described in this
report for the specific case of the GSM radio frequency built-in components of a mobile
phone. These fingerprints are usually generated in the preparation of the base materials of
the components and in the manufacturing process, and their insertion is accidental or intrin-
sic to the process itself. However, they can also be inserted on purpose like, for example,
the Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) concept where physical entities are embodied on
purpose in the physical structure of a component (7). An example of a PUF is the insertion
of specific electronic circuits in an electronic device to generate a reproducible delay in a
specific operation executed by the electronic device. In both cases, fingerprints are usually
tiny variations in the electronic components which can be exploited for the identification of
a mobile phone model or the phone itself if they can generate observable characteristics,
which can be collected and analyzed with an adequate level of precision. The term adequate
is relative to the type of imperfections, the way the observables are collected and other fac-
tors. For example, if the type of imperfections does not appear clearly in the observables or
if their value is depending on environment factors (e.g., temperature), these imperfections
cannot be used to generate the fingerprints because they will not be reproducible in all
the conditions. In another example, the observables must be collected and processed by a
system with a high level of precision to distinguish the small differences in the observables.
This can be see in the processing of RF signals performed by two different test receivers.
The level of accuracy of an high precision receiver can be much higher than a low quality
receiver (see (8)). There is obviously a trade-off because the improvement in accuracy is
gained with an increased cost of the receivers. The fingerprinting of electronic components
has many similarities to the fingerprinting of human beings in biometrics. Indeed, some
requirements for fingerprinting defined in the biometrics domain (9) and (10) can also be
adopted for the fingerprinting of mobile phones:
1. universality, which means that every mobile phone or its electronic components should
have the characteristics that are used for identification;
2. uniqueness, which indicates that no two components should have the same finger-
printing or physical characteristics;
3. permanence, which means that the characteristic should be invariant with time or with
the environment conditions;
4. collectability, which indicates that the characteristics can be measured quantitatively.
In the literature, the terms identification, classification, authentication and verification
are sometimes used with slightly different meanings. For this reason, we provide the
following definitions, which we will be used in the rest of this report:
1. Authentication: is the process of actually confirming the claimed identity of a phone.
Most of the techniques described in this paper have the objective to authenticate a
phone through the physical fingerprints of their components, which are difficult or
impossible to clone.
2. Verification: is a synonym of authentication in this context as it verifies the claimed
identity of a phone.
3. Identification: the recognition system determines a device identity by comparing a
captured device fingerprint with reference fingerprint templates for all known devices.
Identification requires a one-to-many comparison and is considered more difficult than
verification. Note that identification in this context has a different meaning than in
other contexts where identification is the process by which an entity profess to have
a certain identity.
4. Classification: is the process by which mobile phones are classified in different classes
or categories.
4
Verification and authentication is usually performed with a binary classifier: the ob-
servables of two mobile phones are compared using a machine learning algorithm, while
identification and classification is usually performed with a multi-classifier algorithm. The
definition of the algorithms will be described in the section 4.
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3. Description of the GSM standard
GSM is a well established standard in digital communications developed by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), describing protocols for second-generation
(2G) digital cellular networks.
GSM is the widest deployed wireless communication standard in the world, with a pre-
dominant customer base, even if 3G and 4G digital cellular networks have already been, or
are just to be, deployed in a variety of countries. There are billions of GSM mobile phones
in the world, which makes their distribution quite widespread and the cost minimal. Then,
we can assume that most of the users have a GSM mobile phone.
In this section, we focus on the description of the air interface of the GSM standard,
because for the identification of the GSM phones, the understanding of the physical layer
of the GSM standards is the most important.
GSM utilizes a combination of Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) and Time
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) on the Air-interface (11). FDMA and TDMA are used in
combination to produce a two-dimensional array of atomic elements, which are called the
Time slots (TS). In full-rate configuration, eight TS are mapped on every frequency.
In a GSM system, every TDMA frame is assigned a fixed number, which repeats itself in
a time period of 3 hours, 28 minutes, 53 seconds, and 760 milliseconds. This time period
is referred to as hyperframe. The hyperframe is then structured in multiframes, whose
number is dependent on the specific configuration in traffic channels or signaling channels.
The details on the GSM standard can be found in (11).
The structure of the GSM standard at the physical layer is shown in figure 1.
Figure 1: GSM burst definition from (11)
Each time slot lasts for approximately 577 microseconds. The TS are defined in the
same mode both for the GSM uplink channel (i.e., from the GSM mobile phone to the Base
Station) and the GSM downlink channel (i.e., from the Base Station to the GSM mobile
phone). In this report, we use the TS of the GSM uplink channel because we want to locate
the GSM mobile phone rather than the GSM base station (which is known).
Each burst is transmitted independently by the GSM mobile phone, so the procedure of
sending a normal burst is always the same for the RF hardware of the GSM mobile, while
the content (e.g., phone conversation) carried in the payload in the traffic channels may be
different.
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A practical (e.g., sample of a GSM communication) representation in the time domain of a
GSM burst, as we will call it in the rest of this report is presented in figure 2. The structure
of the burst from figure 2 is following:
1. At the start of a burst, the sending power ramps up to the desired signal strength.
This ramp-up section is independent from the content. This is identified by shape 1 in
the figure of the GSM burst.
2. The data payload is split into two data segments of 57 Bits each, with a training
sequence in between. The data segments are content-related and their use for the
fingerprinting of the GSM mobile phone is difficult because the content would change
from one burst to another. The content related sections are identified by shapes 2a
and 2b in the figure of the GSM burst.
3. The midamble or training sequence (shape 3) is not content related and it can be used
for the fingerprinting of the GSM mobile phone.
To summarize, the fingerprinting can be based on all the non-content shapes of the GSM
burst, which include the ramp up, the ramp down and the training sequence. The ramp up
and the ramp down could be sensible to attenuation and multi-path fading effects and they
are usually characterized by a limited number of samples.
Figure 2: GSM burst
4. Methodology, statistical features and machine learning
4.1 Overall workflow
The overall workflow for the extraction of the GSM burst, feature processing and extraction
is provided in figure 3.
The worflow is composed by the following steps:
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1. In the Radio Frequency Signal Collection phase, an Universal Software Radio Peripheral
(USRP) Software Defined Radio platform is used to collect the signals in space. The test
setup to capture the signals is described in section 4.2 and it is always the same for all
the different mobile phones used in the test. The distance and antennas between the
GSM mobile phone and the USRP at which the signals are collected is also described in
section 4.2. The parameters and settings used for the collection of the signal in space
are provided in table 1.
Sampling frequency 1 MSamples/sec full I/Q sampling
Front-end tuning frequency 890.2 MHz (GSM channel 1)
GSM Base station Open BTS Version 3.1.3 on a USRP N200 platform
Table 1: Parameters for signal collection
Note that the base station and digitizer are fully GPS disciplined and synchronized using
GPSDO. To support repeatability and stability, the same USRP digitizer as well as the
same base station were used for all tests, all tests were performed after minimum
half hour lock after the GPS receiver was properly synchronized on at least 4 GPS
satellites. The use of different digitizers of different quality and the robustness of the
identification algorithm is a topic for our future research.
2. In the Baseband down conversion, the signal is received and down-converted using a
WBX, flexible frequency front-end compatible with the USRP with a passing bandwidth
of 40 MHz and tuning capabilities from 20 MHz to 2 GHZ. Then the signal is digitally
down-converted by the USRP built-in DDC employing halfband and CIC (Cascaded
integrator/âcomb) decimators from 100 MHz to 1MHz full IQ.
3. Digital Filtering. The base-band signal could have included interference from other
sources in the environment and base band filtering is needed to ensure that only
the uplink signal of the GSM phone under analysis is collected and processed as the
test were all radiated and not conducted. We used a discrete-time, direct-form fi-
nite impulse response (FIR) filter using Parks-McClellan optimal FIR filter design. The
Parks-McClellan algorithm uses the Remez exchange algorithm and Chebyshev ap-
proximation theory to design filters with an optimal fit between the desired and actual
frequency responses. The filters are optimal in the sense that the maximum error
between the desired frequency response and the actual frequency response is min-
imized. Filters designed this way exhibit an equiripple behavior in their frequency
responses and are sometimes called equiripple filters. The parameters of the filter
were following: a) Sampling Frequency = 1E6, b) Passband Frequency = 230000, c)
Stopband Frequency = 320000, d) Passband Ripple = 0.17099735734, e) Stopband
Attenuation = 0.001 and f) Density Factor = 720.
4. Power normalization. The power of the GSM uplink signal may not be the same for
all the signal collections, given the variability of the propagation environment. As a
consequence, in order to collect statistically significant samples, the RMS power of the
signal was normalized.
5. Extraction of GSM bursts. This is one of the most critical part of the signal collection
process because the bursts must be aligned and synchronized in a precise and consis-
tent way. Only uplink traffic bursts from the DUT are kept. They are extracted from
a single recording of 60 seconds and undergo an initial synchronization using thresh-
olding at 0.05 of the normalized power. Empty bursts are discarded, traffic bursts are
cut and inserted into a sliding window having the duration in samples of a GSM burst
(655 symbols) + 10 in order to fully capture ramp-up and ramp-down. Bursts that
are found outside the sliding window are re-synchronized, the non-compliant bursts
are discarded and the sliding window is aligned again. This problem occurs due to the
loss of samples in the digital section of the software radio.
6. Burst Synchronization. The collected bursts must be synchronized to ensure that
sections of the GSM bursts used for fingerprinting are comparable, otherwise lack of
synchronization could degrade the classification and validation procedures and reduce
the overall accuracy of identification. This procedure discards the remaining bursts
that are malformed to to sample loss in the digital section of the software radio. This
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procedure utilizes the intrinsic correlation properties of the GSM mid-amble in order
to achieve a synchronization error of one sample @ 1 MHz (10−6 seconds). This step
is performed in order to compensate for small out of synch bursts which are caused
by the mobile handset reacting to frequency and time alignment commands sent by
the base station to the mobile phone. These corrections are performed by the base
station and therefore should be considered as bias for signal classification purposes.
The figure of the synchronized burst is shown in figure 4.
7. Extraction of non-content burst segments. Extraction of non-content burst segments.
In this step, we extract the segments of the GSM burst which are not content related.
This step is needed to avoid the fingerprint of the content (e.g., conversation on the
GSM phone) rather than the GSM mobile phone. The extraction of the non-content
sections requires the previous synchronization of the GSM burst to avoid the collection
of content samples due to lack of synchronization among the bursts. The identification
of the non-contents sections are based on the structure of the GSM burst as already
described in section 3.
8. Composition of mini-bursts. This step has the objective to concatenate the non-
content sections from the previous step in a new burst, which contains all the in-
formation needed for the classification and identification of the GSM mobile phone.
9. In the Feature Extraction step, various features are identified and applied to the mini-
bursts (see section 4.3).
10. Then, application classification algorithms (e.g., SVM) are applied to the features ex-
tracted in the previous step. This is described in detail in section 4.4.
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Figure 3: Worflow for the extraction of the fingerprints and classification
4.2 Experimental setup
The setup uses an Universal Software Defined Radio (USRP) system shown in figure 5. The
measurement bench was set up in the laboratory room and consists of a table covered with
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Figure 4: Synchronized GSM bursts
absorbers. The Device Under Test (DUT) and the measurement set are placed at the two
ends the absorber layer at a distance of 84 cm. An image of the setup is presented in figure
5 and a schematic is presented in figure 6. The common parameters of the scenarios are
presented in table 2 and the system timing parameters (specific to GSM) used for burst
synchronization are presented in table 3.
A set of 12 phones were used in the experiment: 3 phones of HTC One model, 3 phones
of iPhone model, 3 phones from Samsung and 3 phones from Sony Experia.
Figure 5: Image of the test bed for GSM mobile phone identification
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Figure 6: Test bed to collect the GSM signal
Sampling frequency 1 MS/sec IQ
Sample recording time 60 seconds
Downlink frequency 935.2 MHz
Uplink frequency 890.2 MHz
Synchronization GPS using GPSDO (min 4 sat, min 30 min lock)
Distance between DUT and RX 0.84 m
USRP gain 5
GSM arfcn 1
OpenBTS version 3.1.3
Table 2: Experimental setup: test bed summary
Bit Rate 2.7086e+05 bps
Sample Frequency 1e+06 S/sec
bits per frame 1250 bps
frame duration 4.6150 ms
bits per burst 156.25 bits
samples per bit 3.6920 Samples
samples per frame 4615 Samples
samples per burst 576.875 Samples
Table 3: System Parameters used in the experimental setup
4.3 Statistical features
If we represent the complex sample signal of the GSM mini-burst in the time domain as:
STD(n) = ITD(n) + jQTD(n) (1)
we define the following features used for fingerprinting:
Mean
µ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(STD) (2)
Standard deviation
σ =
√√√√ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(STD − µ)2 (3)
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Variance
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(STD − µ)2 (4)
Moment of Order 2, which is similar to the variance but with a divisor of N instead of
N-1
1
N
N∑
i=1
(STD − µ)2 (5)
Shannon Entropy, which is the expected value in average of the information contained
in each message.
ShannonEntropy = −
N∑
i=1
(S2TD ∗ Ln(S2TD) (6)
Moment of Order 3
N∑
i=1
(S3TD − µ3) (7)
Skewness, which is a measure of the asymmetry of the probability distribution of a
random variable about its mean
1
σ3
N∑
i=1
(S3TD − µ3) (8)
Kurtosis is a measure of how outlier-prone a distribution is.
1
σ4
N∑
i=1
(S4TD − µ4) (9)
These features were applied to the entire mini-burst and to the specific section of the
mini-bursts: the ramp up, the ramp down and the midamble. All these sections are not
content related and they can be used for fingerprinting of the mobile device.
The application of statistical features to the GSM bursts make the fingerprinting process
easier to process, because the algorithms only need to operate on the limited set of val-
ues of the statistical features rather than the bursts themselves (which are composed by a
large number of samples). The challenge is to select the most appropriate set of statistical
features for fingerprinting. This is achieved through a process called Sequential Feature
Selection where the identification accuracy is calculated with a limited combination of fea-
tures identified from set identified above. Then, a new feature is added to the combination
of features to evaluate if the accuracy improves. The process continues until the accuracy
reach an optimum value. At this stage the optimum combination of statistical features if
identified. The identification accuracy can be based on different metrics defined in the next
section where the machine learning algorithm is also defined.
4.4 Machine Learning algorithm
In the experimental study, we used the Support Vector Machine (SVM) with different Kernel
function algorithms (see (12) for a a description of SVM). The results shown in section 5
are based on the Gaussian Radial Basis Function kernel with different parameters but also
other kernel functions have been used with SVM.
Support Vector Machine (SVM) is a supervised algorithm, which learns to classify the
data points (e.g., originating from the observables), from the labeled training samples
(e.g., the reference fingerprints). SVM separates the labeled set in two areas on a multi-
dimensional surface by using a separating function, which can be of different type: linear,
Radial basis function (RBF), polynomial, sigmoidal are the most common. Because the
multi-dimensional surface is divided in two areas, SVM is a binary classifier and it can be
directly used to distinguish between two mobile phones or for validation (to validate that
the claimed identity of a mobile phone). See (13) for a detailed description of SVM. The
extension of SVM to multi-classifier identification has been proposed by various authors (14)
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and it is available in different libraries: the machine learning toolbox by MATLAB, LIBSVM
and PRTools. The advantage of the SVM for fingerprint classification is that is well known for
its high level of accuracy and robustness against outliers. SVM is less prone to overfitting
than other methods (15). SVM is also quite efficient for binary classification, which is
very important in the verification phase. The disadvantage is that SVM can be slow in the
learning process and they can require a large amount of training time. Some algorithms
used in SVM like Quadratic Programming (QP) methods can be computationally and memory
intensive, so other Kernel methods should be preferred in fingerprint classification.
SVM is a binary classifier, and to perform classification of more than two systems as in
our case (i.e., 12 mobile phones), we need to use a multi-classifier based on SVM. Two
common approaches are the One Against One (OAO) and One Against All (OAA) techniques
(12). OAA involves the division of an N (i.e., 12 in our case) class data-sets into N two-
class cases, while OAO involves the creation of a classification machine composed by N(N-
1)/2 machines for each pair of systems. While OAO is more computationally intensive
than OAA (N(N-1)/2 against N), OAA has some disadvantages especially with unbalanced
training data-sets. Then, we have decided to use OAO. The metric used to calculate the
identification accuracy is based on the confusion matrix.
In the confusion matrix, each column of the matrix represents the instances of a pre-
dicted class while each row represents the instances of the actual class (and vice-versa).
Because in our experiments we used 12 phones, the confusion matrix shown in the results
section 5 has a dimension of 12*12. In the confusion matrix, the correct guesses (i.e., true
positive or negative) are located in the diagonal of the table, so it's easy to inspect the table
for errors, as they will be represented by values outside the diagonal. The confusion matrix
is also used in this report to define the accuracy. The metric is the sum of the diagonal
values of the confusion matrix divided for all the values of the confusion matrix.
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5. Experimental results
In this section, we provides the results of the application of the optimum set of statistical
features and the machine learning algorithm. The confusion matrix of all the used phones
is shown in figure 7. From the confusion matrix, we notice that it is very easy to distinguish
mobile phones of different models, but it is possible to distinguish phones of the same model
with less accuracy. This is understandable because mobile phones of the same model are
built with the same materials and in the same manufacturing plant.
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HTC ONE 1285 136 578 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HTC TWO 259 1560 180 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HTC THREE 566 19 1410 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAMSUNG ONE 0 0 5 1568 285 142 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAMSUNG TWO 0 1 2 383 1049 565 0 0 0 0 0 0
SAMSUNG THREE 1 0 1 251 501 1246 0 0 0 0 0 0
SONY ONE 0 0 0 0 0 0 1250 328 177 70 73 102
SONY TWO 0 0 0 0 0 0 566 688 645 42 27 32
SONY THREE 0 0 0 0 0 0 331 556 1082 15 16 0
iPHONE ONE 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 36 19 1063 367 435
iPHONE TWO 0 0 0 0 0 0 68 13 10 567 954 388
iPHONE THREE 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 4 1 522 218 1204
Figure 7: Confusion matrix among all the phones used in the experiment
Then, we executed the main step of identifying a mobile phone against the reference
library of already existing mobile phones.
The result is shown in figure 8. From the result one column vector, we can see that the
system is able to recognize with very high accuracy the model of the phone, while it even
recognizes the serial number with good accuracy.
In fact the inter-model accuracy is: 908/961 = 94.4%, while the average intra-model
accuracy is 63.55%:
14
HTC ONE 0
HTC TWO 0
HTC THREE 0
SAMSUNG ONE 0
SAMSUNG TWO 0
SAMSUNG THREE 0
SONY ONE 33
SONY TWO 19
SONY THREE 1
iPHONE ONE 514
iPHONE TWO 908
iPHONE THREE 525
Figure 8: Selection vector for the recognition of a phone against the reference library
6. Conclusions
In this report, we have described the demonstration system used to implement the identi-
fication of a mobile phone on the basis of its RF wireless emissions. The demonstrator sys-
tem can provide a very high accuracy for phones belonging to different models (inter-model
identification) and limited accuracy for phones of the same model. Because counterfeit mo-
bile phones are usually built with different electronic components then valid phones, the
inter-model identification applies. We have shown that inter-model accuracy can reach a
value of 94.4%, which is very high and it can be used for the detection of counterfeit mobile
phones with great confidence. In addition, the identification of specific mobile phones can
be used in forensics and criminal investigation.
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